

The Causal Mechanism between Trust in Authorities and Trust in Others:

An Experimental Approach

**Research proposal to the Swedish Science Council
(grant awarded November 2001)**

Bo Rothstein
Department of Political Science
Göteborg
Box 711
SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden
Bo.Rothstein@pol.gu.se

Daniel Eek
Department of Psychology
Göteborg University
Box 500, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden
Daniel.Eek@psy.gu.se

The causal mechanism between trust in authorities and trust in others: An experimental approach

Research Problem and Theoretical Framework

In the year 2000, the National Society of Film Critics, consisting of 57 of the leading film critics from the United States, issued a list of what they considered to be the most important movies produced during the 20th century. As number one on their list they placed Francis Ford Coppola's *The Godfather*. Among the many reasons for their choice, one must surely be that *The Godfather* illustrates something very important about our civilization. It shows, maybe, what human existence has been like during this century; it examines family relations, immigration and multiculturalism, patriarchy, and the eternal questions about good and evil. There are countless ways in which *The Godfather* could be analyzed, but in our context, *The Godfather* is above all a story about trust, distrust, and corruption.

Trust, says Sztompka, can be defined as “a bet on the future contingent on actions of others” (Sztompka 1998, p. 20). When we put our trust in an individual or an institution, we are not completely convinced about what will happen (that would be “blind faith”, which is different from trust). Even if we do not calculate the risks every time we decide whether or not to trust, absolute certainty would make a concept such as trust unnecessary. The first scene in *The Godfather* is about such a bet on the future and, moreover, one that has failed miserably. The very first sentence uttered in this movie is the following: “I believed in America.” The person who says this is Mr. Bonasera, an undertaker of Italian descent. And the person who he says this to is Mr. Corleone, also known as Don Corleone – *The Godfather*. The scene takes place in the latter's study on the day of his daughter's wedding. The story Bonasera tells is truly heartbreaking. Two “all-American” boys have attacked his beloved daughter and “tried to take advantage of her.” When she, according to her father, in desperation “defended her honor,” the two young men beat her up “like an animal,” and so she has ended up in the hospital with serious wounds.

As a true believer in the American system, Bonasera tells Corleone, he had gone to the police. And the police apparently did their job, so that the two thugs were put before the Court. But

here, things started to go awry. Probably because the two WASP boys' families were "well-connected," the judge decided to give them only a suspended sentence. To Bonasera's astonishment "they go free the very same day." The result is that Bonasera's trust in the US legal system instantly breaks down as the two perpetrators leave the court smiling and laughing at him. Not only is his sense of justice violated, he also loses face before the two people who ruined his daughter's (and, by extension, his own) life. And so he now sits before Corleone (whose wife happens to be the victim's real Godmother) and asks for justice. Just as back in the "old country," the government institutions and the legal system of America could not be trusted to act according to basic principles of justice in a situation like this. These institutions were, contrary to Bonasera's beliefs, systematically corrupted. Thus, in order to obtain some sort of justice, Bonasera is compelled to turn to "private protection" in the form of his old friend, the local Mafia boss.

Hearing the story, Corleone becomes irritated. First, he is annoyed because his old friend Bonasera for a long time has avoided his friendship. Apparently this was for good reasons; Bonasera wanted to stay out of trouble. In the new country, his family and his business seemed to have no need for the type of service Corleone could provide. Second, he mocks Bonasera's faith in the police and the courts that were supposed to protect him. How on earth could he believe that the courts and the police would act impartially in a case between an Italian immigrant girl and two boys from old WASP families? As, to a large extent, his criminal organization is based on bribing judges, police officers and politicians, Corleone finds Bonasera's trust in these institutions ridiculously naive. The Godfather seems to argue that because Bonasera decided to place his bet on the wrong horse(s), he now has to pay the price.

But the two men are, after all, old friends, and so Corleone asks what Bonasera wants him to do. To his surprise, Bonasera wants him to kill the boys who harmed his daughter, and he is prepared to pay whatever Corleone asks for such a service. Corleone, hearing this in front of his son and his "Consiligieri," is truly offended by Bonasera's request. In no way is he, in his own eyes, a man who can be paid to kill, as though he were simply a hired gun. Moreover, as he tells Bonasera, that would not be justice; his daughter is alive. "Then make them suffer," begs to poor undertaker. This, according to Corleone, is a more reasonable request, but still he feels insulted. He does not want any money from Bonasera for punishing the two young

perpetrators, he wants something else, namely, loyalty, respect and, most of all, subservience. If, he says, Bonasera had shown him friendship and respect earlier, the two thugs would already have been punished. But, he says, Bonasera hasn't treated him with respect, hasn't shown friendship and even forgets to call him "Don." At this point, Bonasera suddenly seems to remember the customs from the old country – the tone of his voice changes, he kisses the Don's hand and asks him to be his friend. And so, the scene ends with The Godfather assuring Bonasera that he will take care of the problem in a suitable manner and that Bonasera should forget about the money and instead think of this service as an act of friendship. And then he adds the central words – "and one day, and that day might never come, I may come asking you for a favor."

This famous scene illustrates the relationship between social capital, trust and the legitimacy of political institutions. Bonasera had tried to adjust his life to what he thought would be the rules of the game in the United States as compared to those in southern Italy. He had, moreover, tried to move out from the community of "unsocial capital" that characterized the social relations in the old country by removing himself from the circles of the Corleone Mafia family. However, according to his sense of justice, the political institutions in the new country let him down despite what had been implicitly promised. Even if it is not directly stated in the scene, it seems reasonable to believe that the most obvious betrayal of trust has been the broken promise of impartiality in the principle of rule of law. Obviously, Bonasera thought that the fact that he and his daughter were southern European Catholic immigrants and the defendants were from an old White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) community would be of no importance to the court. He falsely presumed that the principle of equality before the law, as stated in the constitution, would be implemented. But, as is well known, public policies can take one form on paper, and then can look quite different once they are put into practice. The scene also illustrates the demand and supply sides of trust. If the judicial system fails to deliver, the demand for some trustworthy protective institution will not just disappear. Instead, Bonasera turns to a "private institution" in his search for a trustworthy supply of justice.

This famous scene illustrates the research question in this project, namely how to understand the causal mechanisms in theories about social capital and trust. The argument in Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* on how trust and social capital is created has received at

lot of attention. In a culture which, for long historical reasons, have been rich in voluntary associations in which people learn the noble art of overcoming problems of collective action and how to rightly understand their self-interests, high levels of social trust is created. Social networks have value because they create “bridging” social capital defined as norms of reciprocity and trust. It is a theory in the Durkheimian tradition, meaning that social trust grows in an “organically” way from below. The great variations in social trust between different societies as it can be measured in for instance survey analyses, is thus explained by variations in the degree to which people participate in voluntary associations and informal social networks.

While Robert Putnam’s theory has got a lot of attention and spurred research into political culture from various disciplines, his theory has also been heavily criticized (cf. Levi 1996; Rothstein 2001 (forthcoming); Tarrow 1996). One of the major problems with his explanation for variation in social trust is that it seems to lack sound micro-foundations, both theoretically and empirically (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). To start with the latter, a number of researchers have questioned the existence of a causal relation between activity in voluntary associations and high levels of social trust. Working with different data sets, Stolle (1998), Whiteley (1999), Newton (1999), and Uslaner (1999) have all come to the conclusion that the relation between high levels of social trust and participation in voluntary associations is spurious. Their research indicate that data showing “joiners” to have a high level of social trust (as measured in surveys) is the result of a “self-selection” mechanism. By this, they mean that it is people that already, at a relatively young age, have been socialized to have a high level social trust, who become members of voluntary associations. Stolle and Uslaner have both shown that activity in voluntary associations does not make people “more trusting.” Thus, empirically, it has not been possible to confirm that membership or activity in voluntary associations, at the individual levels, makes people “more trusting.” Instead, people become “joiners” because they already, for reasons that we don’t know, believe that “most people can be trusted.”

Theoretically, it is difficult to construct a compelling argument for why people who are very active in voluntary associations should become more trusting towards others “in general.” It may as well be the case that such associations produce distrust, especially towards people in “competing” networks and organizations. Activity in, for example, religious, ethnic, political,

gender- or class-based associations may produce distrust towards members in other religious, ethnic gender- or class-based associations. It could for example be argued that the problem in former Yugoslavia was that they had too much “social capital” and were too much engaged in voluntary associations. Social networks in such a society may produce distrust in two ways. First, by establishing a norm that people in “the other” group should not be trusted and other forms of “group-think.” Secondly, by arguing that universal norms intended to guide government institutions are biased against ones own group.

According to Hardin (1995), universal norms, such as the impartiality of the legal system and principles such as equality before the law, are inherently weak. This is because no “special interest groups” have reasons to defend them. The reason is that such universal institutions are by definition not intended to serve any special interest, but instead “the common” or “the public” interest. Universal norms and policies are therefore constantly under pressure from groups arguing that they are not really universal, either in their very construction or in the way they are being implemented. Instead, the ruling class, the patriarchal network, the dominant religious and/or ethnic group, etc., mask what is only their raw self-interest behind the shining principles of universalism and impartiality.

The other side of this coin is of course that such an argument against universal institutions and norms may be correct. Corruption and systematic discrimination by government authorities based on ethnic, gender, class, and religion is of course common in many situations. Within political philosophy, the possibility of maintaining universal political institutions in a multi-cultural society is hotly debated (Barry 2000; Young 1990). Not only the defense but also the “production” of universal norms and institutions seems to be problematic (Rothstein 2000).

Confidence in government and social trust

A lot of research has been made to understand the link between “horizontal trust”, (i.e., trust in other people) and trust/confidence in government institutions (i.e., “vertical trust”) (Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Newton 1999). Already in 1968, Nobel Laureate Gunnar Myrdal in his book “Asian Drama”, coined the term “the soft state” to describe the problem facing many third-world countries. According to Myrdal, the absence of the rule of law and other

universal norms in the public administration made economic and social development problematic. Without using its formal techniques, Myrdal also captured the essence of the importance of game theory in this discussion, namely the idea of agents as strategic actors using information from “history of play” when making their decision whether to “cooperate” or to “defect.” Agents in “soft states” often decided to “defect”, because they reasoned in the following way: “Well, if everybody seems corrupt, why shouldn’t I be corrupt” (Myrdal 1968, p. 409). Corruption thus had two cognitive dimensions, one influencing beliefs about “other people”, the other influencing beliefs about government institutions. The problem so far has been to establish a theory about how to understand how the causal mechanism(s) should be specified (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). Analyzing the World Value studies, Inglehart (1999) has argued that, “it seems likely that democratic institutions are conducive to interpersonal social trust, as well as trust being conducive to democracy” (Inglehart 1999, p. 104). The difficulty in this discussion is how to specify the causal connection(s) between these variables. A major problem using survey data for this kind of research is that while correlations between cognitive beliefs can be established, it is much more difficult to specify causality.

The discussion about the connection between horizontal and vertical trust has also suffered from a conceptual problem in that the latter variable has been under-specified. Government institutions come in many forms, and there is no reason to believe that all of them should influence horizontal trust in the same way or even in the same direction. First, empirical research shows that people have very different opinions about the trustworthiness and ethical standards of different types of government institutions. For instance, a recent Swedish survey showed that 69 % of respondents thought that local politicians are engaged in “serious misuse of power,” while only 14 % held such a sinister view about judges. One explanation may be that in a democracy, some government institutions, for example a city government, are expected to act in a partisan way. After all, that is what they are elected for. It is therefore difficult to see why such government institutions should influence interpersonal trust at all. If “the other party” runs the city, why should my trust in other people be affected?

However, a democratic political system has two sides, one for input/representation and one for output/implementation. The hypothesis we want to test in the proposed project is that it is the quality of the “output” institutions that may be crucial for the development of horizontal

trust. There are several reasons for this argument. First, the implementation side of the political system is what most citizens come into direct contact with, much more often than with the “input” side. Contacts with politicians are rather rare events for most citizens compared to contacts with government institutions responsible for the implementation of public policies. Secondly, the implementation of public policies at the individual level is not supposed to be partial. To the contrary, principles such as equality before the law, honesty, and impartiality are supposed to guide what “street-level” bureaucrats do. Third, as Tyler (1998) has shown, most people make a distinction between “substantial justice” and “procedural justice” and take the latter very much into consideration when they decide if a process is legitimate or not. Procedural justice in this sense is clearly connected to norms about impartiality in the implementation of public policies.

Thus, the causal mechanism between vertical trust in government institutions at the implementation side and horizontal trust may run as follows. In a society where it is “common knowledge” that the impartiality of government officials can be corrupted, there will also be “common knowledge” that “most people” cannot be trusted to “play by the rules” because they are likely to be engaged in corrupting public officials. But it may also be the case that individuals refrain from such “non-cooperative” behavior because it is generally known that government officials usually do not expect to be bribed or in other ways corrupted. But if Person A thinks that Person B is corrupting the impartiality of government institutions, and is getting away with it, his/her trust in government institutions will of course go down, but so will his trust in his fellow citizens. If the same person thinks that such corrupt exchanges are the norm rather than the exception, both his horizontal and his vertical trust will go down. The causal mechanism we want to analyze here is that horizontal trust runs from trust in the universalism of government institutions responsible for the implementation of public policies (i.e., vertical trust).

At the aggregate level, there seem to be some initial support for this hypothesis. Countries known to have high levels of interpersonal trust, for instance the Scandinavian countries, are also known to be comparatively free from government corruption, and vice versa (Blomkvist 2001; Paldam and Svendsen 2000). In another empirical study using cross-national survey data, it is stated that: “Trust is relatively strongly correlated with ‘judicial efficiency’, ‘anticorruption’, ‘growth’ and ‘bureaucratic quality’” (La Porta et al. 1997, p. 336). In yet

another such study, the conclusion is that “at the aggregate level, social trust and confidence in government and its institutions are strongly associated with each other. Social trust can help build effective social and political institutions, which can help governments perform effectively, and this in turn encourages confidence in civic institutions” (Newton and Norris 1999, p. 12). The problem, however, is as described above: We don’t know if there is a causal mechanism at the individual level, and we don’t know how such a causal mechanism might actually work. In order to analyze this problem, an experimental research strategy is needed.

Specifying the Causal Mechanism – the research hypothesis

The main research task is to describe the causal mechanism underlying horizontal and vertical trust. Thus, the research question is whether an increased horizontal trust leads to an increased vertical trust or a high vertical trust leads to a high horizontal trust. Or maybe there is a third factor explaining the correlation. In order to shed light over this causal relationship, it is first of all important to determine what factors affect the degree of vertical and horizontal trust people display.

As specified above, the causal mechanism between trust in government institutions responsible for the implementation of laws and polices, and horizontal trust is hypothesized to hold three dimensions: (1) If public officials are known to be corrupted, Person A will infer that even individuals responsible for guarding public interests cannot be trusted. Therefore cannot “most people” be trusted. (2) Person A will infer that “most people” cannot be trusted since they are engaged in direct or indirect corruption of government institutions. (3) In order to “survive”, Person A will be forced to engage in corruption, even if he doesn’t want to.

One way to illustrate the explanatory capacity of this approach is to put it in contrast to the main social capital hypothesis about the importance of civic engagement. Patterson (1999) reports “a truly disturbing” result from surveys about social trust in the U.S., namely that Afro-Americans “are the most untrusting group in the nation.” This is true for nearly all groups of blacks – rich or poor, young or old, married or unmarried. Patterson’s explanation for this “disturbing” result is that blacks’ mistrust is rooted in the inherited cultural experience of slavery and the “Herrenvolk” type of democracy in the South. An alternative explanation

for this "disturbing" result that would be in line with our hypothesis is that blacks in the U.S. have experienced systematic discrimination and other forms of race-based corruption from government institutions responsible for implementing public policies such as the police and the legal system. The policy implication, if our hypothesis is correct, is of some importance. What is needed in black communities in the U.S., as well as in depressed immigrant neighborhoods in Scandinavia and in many third world countries, to increase social capital is not increased participation in voluntary associations and networks, but improved quality in government institutions responsible for the implementation of public policies.

Research Design and Method

The research strategy we propose is to conduct two series of experiments with undergraduates as participants to test whether or not this proposed causal mechanism is valid. Experimental research with its possibilities to create research environments with high internal validity is becoming the most commonly utilized method to study causality in the social sciences.

The first series of experiments aims partly at studying what factors influence the level of trust people hold to different political institutions (i.e., vertical trust) and to "most people" (i.e., horizontal trust), partly at illuminating a possible causal mechanism between the two forms of trust in scenario studies. The second series of experiments builds on the first and focuses directly on the causal relationship between the two forms of trust and studies participants' actual behavior in interdependent situations with others.

Since it generally is the government institutions that are responsible for the implementation of laws and policies that, based on previous research using survey data, are expected to be of special significance to the causal mechanism between the two forms of trust, special emphasis will in both series of experiments be put on trust in the police and the court system as indicators of vertical trust.

It is hypothesized that vertical trust causes horizontal trust. However, the experiments will be designed in order to investigate both directions of the relationship. Moreover, it might be the case that there is an interaction effect between how high or low one form of trust is (horizontal or vertical trust) and the strength of the causal link to the other form of trust. For

instance, if Person A lives in a society where the vertical trust is low due to the fact that political institutions are bribed etc., Person A's low vertical trust is likely to affect his horizontal trust negatively (for reasons specified in previous sections). On the other hand, if Person A lives in a society where it is known that political institutions cannot be bribed etc., and the vertical trust therefore is high, the strength of the causal link to Person A's degree of horizontal trust might be weaker.

Measuring trust

There are several ways to measure trust (Couch and Jones 1997; Parks 1994) and a lot of research has been conducted on the role of trust in various situations (e.g., Cook 2001). In the proposed project, a few measures will be utilized. First, to measure horizontal trust, a revised version (Yamagishi 1992) of the trust scale successfully employed by Yamagishi and Sato (1986) will be used. This scale consists of the following items: (1) In dealing with strangers, one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy. (2) In these competitive times, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you. (3) Society will fall apart if the police power that counters criminal activities weakens. (4) One should not trust others until one knows them well. (5) Most people tell a lie when they can benefit by doing so. (6) When someone says something complimentary about you it's because they want to get something from you. (7) People will take advantage of you when you work with them. (8). Given the opportunity, people are dishonest. Additionally, the same measures as have been used in the survey studies reviewed previously, will also be adopted.

Second, to measure vertical trust, the methods adopted in surveys will be used. Furthermore, questions about vertical trust are clearly related to issues about procedural justice. Initial procedural justice research was conducted primarily to distinguish concerns for procedural justice (i.e., the question whether or not the procedures leading to an outcome distribution are regarded as fair) from concerns for distributive justice (i.e., the question whether or not the distribution of outcomes in itself is regarded as fair) (Van den Bos, Vermunt, and Wilke 1997). Issues of procedural justice are relatively unaffected by issues of distributive justice (Lind and Tyler 1997). The proposed project will borrow aspects from the procedural justice area of research to study vertical trust.

Planned experiments

Experiment series 1. The first series of experiments uses scenario studies and is divided into two phases. The purpose of phase 1 is to determine what factors influence vertical trust and horizontal trust, respectively. The purpose of phase 2 is to study the causal relationship between the two forms of trust. Both phases 1 and 2 give computerized information to participants, and participants are asked to indicate their responses through the computer.

In phase 1, participants' initial levels of horizontal and vertical trust will first be measured. Thereafter, one group of participants will be asked to imagine themselves taking part in several different scenarios describing own and/or others' encounters with civil servants of different government institutions. The other group of participants will be asked to imagine themselves taking part in similar scenarios describing own and/or others' encounters with other "everyday" people. The purpose of phase 1 is to manipulate factors in the scenarios to see whether or not they influence participants' levels of vertical and/or horizontal trust. Thus, after reading the scenarios, participants will be asked to imagine that the information in the scenario was known as "common knowledge" in the society where they live, and, in relation to this, complete the different trust scales. This will be done in order to infer whether or not the provided information influenced their trust in the specific government institution and/or in other people. Thus, the goal of phase 1 is to have a number of key factors that reliably affect participants' level of vertical trust, as well as a number of key factors affecting their level of horizontal trust.

In phase 2, four new groups of participants will be recruited to study the causal relationships between the two forms of trust, and whether or not the causal link differs as a result of whether low or high levels of trust have been induced. Participants are asked to imagine that the scenarios they read are "common knowledge" in the society where they live. One group of participants will be asked to read several scenarios that, from phase 1, reliably affect the level of vertical trust positively (i.e., that induce high levels of vertical trust). A second group will be given scenarios that affect the level of vertical trust negatively (i.e., that induce low levels of vertical trust). A third group will be given scenarios that affect the level of horizontal trust positively. Finally, a fourth group will be given scenarios that affect the level of horizontal trust negatively.

After the scenarios, participants in all groups will be asked to complete the measures of horizontal and vertical trust. On the basis of the differences in trust levels between the groups, we will be able to conclude whether or not there is a causal link between the two forms of trust, and in what direction it works. For instance, if our hypothesis, that vertical trust affects horizontal trust, is true, we should expect the groups to have similar levels of horizontal trust, but different levels of vertical trust. Furthermore, the design permits to study a possible interaction effect between high vs. low trust and the strength of the causal link to the other form of trust. The design also permits subsequent experiments to study whether or not the causal link between the two forms of trust is similar for vertical trust in different authorities.

Experiment series 2. The second series of experiments builds on the connection to procedural justice to induce high and low levels of vertical trust. Several ways to induce procedural justice and injustice have been established in previous research. For instance, participants can be informed that they and others each have a voice to vote for how to distribute payments among themselves and others for participating in an experiment. Participants can thereafter be informed that they are not allowed to use their voice - unfair procedure - or that they are allowed to use it - fair procedure - (e.g., Van den Bos, Lind, and Wilke 1997). By using similar approaches, procedural justice (high vertical trust) and injustice (low vertical trust) will be induced by the Experimenter (acting as something similar to an “authority”) to different groups of participants in Experiment series 2.

Participants will participate in the experiments in dyads (i.e., “Self” and “Other”). The manipulation of horizontal trust can be made in many ways. For instance, to induce high horizontal trust, one group of participants can receive (false) feedback that the “Other” is willing to share payments equally. To induce low horizontal trust, another group of participants can receive (false) feedback suggesting that the “Other” wants to take a lot more to him- or herself. As a measure of how much they trust the Experimenter (vertical trust) and how much they trust the “Other” (horizontal trust), participants will play a number of iterated trials of the so called Trust Game (Snijders 1996; Snijders and Keren. 1999). The Trust Game is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The Trust Game (from Snijders, 1996).

Player 1 has a choice between Right or Down. If Right is chosen, both players receive (in this case) 20 points. If Down is chosen, Player 2 has the choice between Right or Down. If Player 2 chooses Right, Player 2 receives 50 points and Player 1 receives 5 points. If Player 2 chooses Down, both players receive 30 points. The question is whether or not Player 1 is willing to trust Player 2.

Based on the causal mechanism illuminated in the scenario studies in Experiment series 1, testable predictions can be made concerning how participants will act in the Trust Game when confronted with the Experimenter and/or the “Other”. The basic setup of this experiment can then be used to study the effects of other factors that we, from Experiment series 1, know affect participants’ levels of both forms of trust (e.g., discrimination, impartiality to the law etc.).

Time plan

During 2002 we will execute and analyze the results of the Experiment series 1. Experiment series 2 will start in 2003 and be finished by the end of this year. The last year will be devoted to complementary experiments, data analysis, and reporting of the results.

Dissemination of results

The results will be reported in 4-6 articles in international journals, both in political science and psychology, of good standing.

Ethical considerations

The applicants will fully abide with ethical guidelines. Participants will be fully informed, participate on a voluntary basis, and be able to discontinue their participation at their own free will in the experiments.

Gender aspects

No gender differences have been found in the research area that the planned research project is situated. Therefore, no emphasis will be put on gender aspects. However, equal numbers of men and women will be recruited as participants in the experiments.

Research resources

Research group

The Principal Investigator (PI) will be Professor Bo Rothstein. He will have the main responsibility for the project as a regular part of his research as a professor at the university. He will devote an estimated working time of 20 % to the project, but he will not need to be financed by the project. Co-PI will be Dr. Daniel Eek. He will be responsible for planning, organizing, and conducting the experiments. Eek has no permanent position at the university, but is presently financed through external research grants. He will be employed as a researcher in the project (75 % of full time). Rothstein and Eek will together analyze and report the results of the experiments. We need to employ a research assistant (25 % of full time) who will recruit participants and administer the data collection.

International collaboration

Bo Rothstein has worked in an international research group for the study of social capital lead by Robert D. Putnam. He is currently engaged in an international research project entitled “Trust, honesty, and government” lead by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Janos Komai.

Daniel Eek is a member of the Research Unit of Societal and Environmental Decision Analysis (RUSEDA; see homepage: <http://www.psy.gu.se/eng/etexter/ruseda.htm> for information) at the Department of Psychology, Göteborg University. RUSEDA has a lot of experience in experimental studies and research. The experiments will be conducted within this research unit. RUSEDA has well-established international contacts with professor David Budescu at University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign, USA, professor David M. Messick at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA, professor Robyn M. Dawes at Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, professor Kjell Törnblom at University of Colorado, Denver, USA, and professor Henk A. M. Wilke at University of Leiden, Holland.

Equipment

The RUSEDA group has a laboratory in place with several computers and computer programs necessary for carrying out the experiments.

Materials

A departmental fee of 7.5 % of all costs is mandatory and covers the costs of secretary, computer service, transports, telephone/fax, library etc. Additionally, we apply for SEK 20,000 annually to cover the costs of necessary literature, experimental materials, and copying. Participants in the experiments will be paid between SEK 50 and SEK 100 for their participation. Experiment series 1 and 2 require about 300 participants each (including pilot studies). Therefore, we apply for SEK 22,000 for each experiment series. For year 3, we apply for another SEK 5,000 for possible additional experiments.

Travels

We plan to present the results at a number of international conferences, such as “The 13th international conference of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology”, 2002, in Spain and conferences organized by The American Political Science Association. The total costs for attending these conferences are estimated to SEK 45,000.

Curriculum Vitae**Bo Rothstein**

Bo Rothstein is August Röhss Professor in Political Science at Göteborg University in Sweden. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Lund in 1986 and worked at the Department of Government at Uppsala University 1986-1995 as assistant, and from 1992, as associate professor. He served as Professor in Labor Market Policy at the Swedish Institute for Work Life Research in Stockholm 1994-1995, and as adjunct professor at the University of Bergen 1994-1996. He has been a visiting scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation, Cornell University, Harvard University, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and at the University of Washington in Seattle.

Curriculum Vitae

Daniel Eek

Daniel Eek is a researcher at the Department of Psychology at Göteborg University and a member of the research unit for Cognitive, Motivational and Social Psychology Unit at the department led by Professor Tommy Gärling and a member of the Research Unit of Societal and Environmental Decision Analysis (RUSED) led by Professor Tommy Gärling and Associate Professor Anders Biel. Eek received his Ph. D. in 1999 from the Department of Psychology, Göteborg University, on a dissertation entitled “Distributive justice and cooperation in real-life social dilemmas”. He has been involved as a researcher in several research projects financed by different Swedish research foundations.

Selected Publications

Bo Rothstein

The Social Democratic State. The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problems of Social Reforms. University of Pittsburgh Press (1996).

Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State. Cambridge University Press. (1998).

“Voluntary Associations and the Transition to Democracy in Sweden”, in Dietrich Rueschemeyer et. al. (eds). Participation and Democracy: East and West. Armonk: M E Sharpe (1998).

“Social Capital in the Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and Civil Society”, forthcoming in Robert D. Putnam (ed). A Decline of Social Capital? Political Culture as a Condition for Democracy. Guttersloh: Bertelsmann Verlag and Oxford

University press. A version of this chapter has also been accepted for publication in Politics and Society.

“The Universal Welfare State as a Social Dilemma”, in Mark Van Vugt, Mark Snyder, Anders Biel & Tom Tyler (eds): Collective Problems in Modern Societies: Dilemmas and Solutions. Routledge (2000). A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Rationality and Society.

“The Future of the Universal Welfare State”, in Stein Kuhnle (ed): *Survival of the European Welfare State*. Routledge (2000).

“Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memory”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* (2000).

“Varifrån kommer det sociala kapitalet?”, *Socialvetenskaplig Tidskrift* (2000).

“Demokrati, socialt kapital och förtroende”, in S. Holmberg & L. Weibull (red:er): *Ljusnande framtid? SOM-institutet, Göteborgs Universitet* (2000).

Välfärdsstatens nya ansikte: Demokrati och marknadsmodeller inom offentlig sektor. Agora Förlag (2000). (Tillsammans med Paula Blomquist)

Publications

Daniel Eek

Biel, A., Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (1996). Provision of community social services: The role of distributive fairness for willingness to pay. In W. B. G. Liebrand & D. M. Messick (Eds.), *Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research* (pp. 57-76). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Biel, A., Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (1996). Viljan att bidra till resurser för barnomsorg. *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, 4, 420-428.

Biel, A., Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (1997). Distributive justice and willingness to pay for municipality child care. *Social Justice Research*, 10, 63-80.

Biel, A., Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (1999). The importance of fairness for cooperation in public-goods dilemmas. In P. Juslin & H. Montgomery (Eds.), *Judgment and decision making: Neo-Brunswikian and process-tracing approaches* (pp. 245-259). London: Erlbaum.

Eek, D., Biel, A., & Gärling, T. (1998). The effect of distributive justice on willingness to pay for municipality child care: An extension of the GEF hypothesis. *Social Justice Research*, 11, 121-142.

Eek, D., Biel, A., & Gärling, T. (2000). Willingness to contribute to the finance of public social services. In M. Van Vugt, M. Snyder, T. Tyler, & A. Biel (Eds.), *Cooperation in modern society: Promoting the welfare of communities, states and organizations* (pp. 195-209). London: Routledge.

Eek, D., Biel, A., & Gärling, T. (in press). Cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas when equality is perceived as unfair. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*.

Gustafsson, M., Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (in press). Asymmetrical access to information in social dilemmas with resource uncertainty. In R. Suleiman, D. Budescu, I. Fischer, & D. Messick (Eds.), *Contemporary psychological research on social dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Selart, M., & Eek, D. (1999). Contingency and value in social decision making. In P. Juslin & H. Montgomery (Eds.), *Judgment and decision making: Neo-Brunswikian and process-tracing approaches* (pp. 261-273). London: Erlbaum.

References

Barry, Brian. 2000. *Culture and Equality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Blomkvist, Hans. 2001. Stat och förvaltning i u-länder. In *Politik som organisation*, 3:e uppl., edited by B. Rothstein. Stockholm: SNS.
- Braithwaite, Valerie, and Margaret Levi, eds. 1998. *Trust and Governance*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Cook, Karen S., ed. 2001. *Trust in Society*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Couch, L. L., and W. H. Jones. 1997. Measuring levels of trust. *Journal of Research in Personality* 31:319-336.
- Hardin, Russell. 1995. *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hedström, Peter, and Richard Swedberg. 1998. *Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay*. In *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, edited by P. Hedström and R. Swedberg. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1999. Trust, well-being and democracy. In *Democracy & Trust*, edited by M. E. Warren. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. Trust in large organizations. *American Economic Review* 87 (2):333-338.
- Levi, Margaret. 1996. Social and Unsocial Capital. A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*. *Politics & Society* 24 (1):45-55.
- Lind, E. A., and T. R. Tyler. 1997. *The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice*. New York: Plenum.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. *Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
- Newton, Kenneth. 1999. Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies. In *Critical citizens: global support for democratic government*, edited by P. Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Newton, Ken, and Pippa Norris. 1999. Confidence in Public Institutions. Atlanta: Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Paldam, Martin, and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen. 2000. Missing Social Capital and the Transition in Eastern Europe. Aarhus: Aarhus University, Department of Economics.
- Parks, C. D. 1994. The predictive ability of social values in resource dilemmas and public goods games. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 20:431-438.
- Patterson, Orlando. 1999. Liberty against the democratic state. on the historical and contemporary sources of American distrust. In *Democracy & Trust*, edited by M. E. Warren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rothstein, Bo. 2000. Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12 (4):477-503.
- Rothstein, Bo. 2001 (forthcoming). Social Capital in the Social Democratic State. *The Swedish Model and Civil Society*. *Politics and Society* 29.
- Snijders, C. 1996. *Trust and Commitments*. Utrecht: University of Utrecht.
- Snijders, C., and Keren. G. 1999. Determinants of trust. In *Games and Human Behavior. Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport*, edited by D. V. Budescu, E. I. and R. Zwick. Mahwah, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Stolle, Dietlind. 1998. Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalized Trust in Voluntary Associations. *Political Psychology* 19 (3):497-526.
- Sztompka, Piotr. 1998. Trust,, Distrust and Two Paradoxes of Democracy. *European Journal of Social Theory* 1 (1):19-32.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work. *American Political Science Review*.

Tyler, Tom R. 1998. Trust and Democratic Governance. In *Trust & Governance*, edited by V. Braithwaite and M. Levi. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Uslaner, Eric. 1999. Democracy and social capital. In *Democracy & Trust*, edited by M. E. Warren. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Van den Bos, K., E. A. Lind, and H. A. M. Wilke. 1997. How do I judge my outcome when I do not know the outcome of others? The psychology of the fair process effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72:1034-1046.

Van den Bos, K., R. Vermunt, and H. A. M. Wilke. 1997. Procedural and distributive justice: What is fair depends more on what comes first than on what comes next. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72:95-104.

Whiteley, Paul F. 1999. The Origins of Social Capital. In *Social Capital and European Democracy*, edited by J. W. van Deth, M. Maraffi, K. Newton and P. F. Whiteley. London: Routledge.

Yamagishi, T. 1992. Group size and the provision of a sanctioning system in a social dilemma. In *Social dilemmas Theoretical issues and research findings*, edited by W. Liebrand, D. Messick and H. Wilke. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Yamagishi, T., and K. Sato. 1986. Motivational bases of the public goods problem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50:67-73.

Young, Iris M. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.